CANARY / PUBLIC PROOF
Canary Scanapse
A dated public trust statement, signed and independently verifiable, designed to preserve continuity over time.
A public reference point for continuity
Scanapse does not only expose a signature. It publishes a dated state that can be compared over time, independently checked and reused as an audit reference.
Why this Canary exists
A trust mechanism is useful only when its purpose is understandable and its evidence can be checked outside the interface.
Public transparency
Expose a dated statement instead of asking visitors to trust an undocumented promise.
Independent verification
Make the signed bytes and public verification material available without depending on this page.
Public memory
Keep successive signed states so changes can be situated in time rather than overwritten.
Governance reference
Provide a reusable reference for audit, due diligence and operational follow-up.
Current public statement
Each declaration belongs to the exact signed payload. Any alteration changes the hash and invalidates verification.
The Scanapse Canary signing chain is operational at the time of this publication.
No known compromise currently affects the Scanapse Canary signing mechanism.
No Canary operational private key has knowingly been disclosed to an unauthorized third party.
No known unauthorized modification currently affects the integrity of the Scanapse service.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROOFOpen technical verification data
- Algorithm
- Ed25519
- Root key ID
ed6dba0e21d1ee4509bcd9d3- Operational key ID
1ec105e17aae239d745446ff- Root fingerprint
sha256:ed6dba0e21d1ee4509bcd9d3ac8190332cd8be65c03024a2160be1bf0a890669- Operational fingerprint
sha256:1ec105e17aae239d745446ff0279427b22c5a078e8d87f0ff4514c3813c19743- Payload SHA-256
fb67799b8533f3db33db95262dfaa31049a19053bd7f331df1dc8ff13d9cba77- Envelope SHA-256
b070b22f3ff846357d64c3f2a3d9ac8145f046a6d92fc73b4b08b38ca5995baa- Previous Canary SHA-256
8503c3d365b114e3c9f69f6090d0a039f77c215568068fc44b1689b9421cfee5- Continuity
- Continuity verified
Verifiable public memory
Each signed publication becomes a durable time marker. The timeline below is derived only from the signed envelopes already published by Scanapse.
- #1 · Genesis2026-09-05 16:00 UTCValid until 2026-09-19 16:00 UTC
- #2 · Manual publication2026-09-05 16:00 UTCValid until 2026-09-19 16:00 UTC
- #3 · Manual publication2026-09-05 16:44 UTCValid until 2026-09-19 16:44 UTC
Publication history
Review the recent signed envelopes that form this public chain of evidence.
| # | Publication | Expiration | Origin | State | Proof |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| #3 | 2026-09-05 16:44 UTCSigned envelope | 2026-09-19 16:44 UTCValidity window | manual | valid | b070b22f3ff846357d64c3f2a3d9ac8145f046a6d92fc73b4b08b38ca5995baa |
| #2 | 2026-09-05 16:00 UTCSigned envelope | 2026-09-19 16:00 UTCValidity window | manual | valid | 8503c3d365b114e3c9f69f6090d0a039f77c215568068fc44b1689b9421cfee5 |
| #1 | 2026-09-05 16:00 UTCSigned envelope | 2026-09-19 16:00 UTCValidity window | manual | valid | 677462318830581c3e00e33931c5d73bbefce410361e7a8e617df0ff63f90a15 |
How this fits into Scanapse
The Canary is one layer of the Scanapse evidence model: public domains are observed, their visible signals are documented over time, and the Canary adds a signed continuity reference for Scanapse itself.
It turns a technical mechanism into a knowledge-management object: a public state, its context, its history and the evidence needed to verify it.
Concrete uses
- Attach a dated proof to an audit or supplier review.
- Check that a public statement remains continuous over time.
- Give a client or partner a machine-verifiable reference.
- Connect trust evidence with public-domain observations and change history.
Integrity and delegated signing identity
A valid signature proves that the published payload has not changed since signing and that the signing key was delegated by the published Scanapse root.
No conclusion beyond the published evidence
It does not prove the absence of an external constraint, an undetected compromise, or an event that has not yet been published.
Raw endpoints expose canonical JSON bytes and public verification material without HTML transformation.