OBSERVE · CONNECT · UNDERSTAND
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Read a domain

PUBLIC DOMAIN DOSSIER

dimaready.com

What is observed, how to verify it and what changed

4 public observations are documented in this dossier.

1 structuring public dependencies are visible.

55 useful changes are retained since the previous reading.

4 points still require confirmation or cannot be observed from outside.

Measured 2026-09-05 17:21 UTC First observation 2026-09-04 19:46 UTC Latest observation 2026-09-05 17:21 UTC
History Compare JSON Markdown

TIME

What changed over time

Compared with the previous stored reading

25Appeared
8Modified
9Stable
22Disappeared
New

Canary signal

New

Cookie

New

Csp evidence

Disappeared

Dependency provider

New

Dependency provider

New

Dns address

2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a

SHORT VIEW

Four readings before the detail

The 12 historical angles remain available below for deeper inspection.

Identity & governance

  • Not observable from outsideOrigin host
  • ObservedDepends on providerInfomaniak
  • To confirmOpenpgp

Infrastructure & transport

  • ObservedTls issuerC = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = YR1
  • Not testedPost quantum tls

Mail & trust

  • ObservedDmarc policyreject
  • ObservedSpf policyhardfail

Dependencies & exposure

  • Not observable from outsideData location

Explanatory record

What Scanapse understands about this domain

Scanapse has enough material to describe 11 of 12 knowledge angles for dimaready.com. 2 questions remain open with the available public evidence.

Measured on 2026-09-05 17:21 UTC Engine 2.8.0

Read the domain folder

The key points for reading this domain folder

Four key points to understand what Scanapse observed, what can reasonably be retained, and what still needs verification.

Key points

Worth looking at today

Only a few items are shown when they add something genuinely useful to the reading.

DEPENDENCIES

Critical function concentration

Infomaniak is associated with 3 critical function(s) or observations in the visible scope.

This concentration is descriptive. It does not prove a future outage or the absence of failover mechanisms invisible to the scan.
DNS

Observable DNS delegation changed

The observed nameserver set differs from the previous measurement.

The change alone does not prove a complete migration, improvement, or degradation.
DEPENDENCIES

New observable provider

New provider(s) visible since the previous measurement: Infomaniak.

A newly observed dependency does not necessarily describe a new contractual relationship or personal-data transfer.

Territorial and legal context

Which legal context can reasonably be retained

Scanapse distinguishes established, probable and to-confirm jurisdiction and always explains which clues support the reading.

To confirm To confirm

Why this context appears

  • No sufficiently reliable public jurisdiction clue was found in the report

What this does not establish

  • Technical hosting, IP addresses, ASNs and CDN locations do not establish the applicable legal jurisdiction by themselves.
  • The applicable jurisdiction requires additional public or organisational evidence.

Regulatory frameworks

Useful texts for this context

References are selected from the observed context. Their presence explains potential relevance, never automatic compliance.

To confirmTo determine

Regulatory context to determine

The available public evidence does not establish a sufficiently reliable jurisdiction for automatic legal contextualisation.

This section provides documentary context. It is not legal advice, certification or a compliance verdict.

Trajectory

Useful changes since the previous reading

Only differences that help interpretation are highlighted. Stable or purely technical variations remain available in the evidence.

Changed

Canary signal

Not observedStructured value changed

Changed

Cookie

Not observeddimaready_session

Changed

Csp evidence

Not observedStructured value changed

Changed

Provider dependency

CloudflareNot observed

12 knowledge angles

12 angles to understand the domain

Each angle explains what is known, why it matters, how to read it, its purpose and its limits.

01
Documented Change observed

Domain identity

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 01

Domain identity

Documented Change observed

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

10evidence
15changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
10
Signals
2
Changes
15
dns_nameserver dns 6f77de6c4303242bdf8a0d7befe8d2c4ed4fc243c560f200d1e82f30de785534 
"ns11.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 9dff3868b397222fa8c5f18c2a020ed3a9192bd7166f7adddf06fffab60589d7 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
dmarc_record dns e809572e75a5f245849a7f142c81d1457c8e66e6b29143626c9de3c3671a5efd 
"v=DMARC1; p=reject;"
module_finding dns ee982ef0312e8a10d991bf266b990e03a05f3e1cde38aee3c6bf93a7ddc37f65 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
dns_nameserver dns 4b835c0bff773fb2582a4bdc3e9cdb9bd521c2907a0e03de23fc70fdfb412579 
"ns12.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 46c48c9cec11755627573e52af3785fa29f0e3dda3f6836a40325265ebc05edb 
{
    "evidence": {
        "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.",
        "status": "not_tested"
    },
    "severity": "info"
}
dns_address dns a4962c4c9ec9a4279e0edabbe889e07eb764e3d48da373eee657d09053530d95 
"2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a"
spf_record dns a892ec0c291fcdfdadc04c4bf3b0f281c6ec85ffb81ec9634717d6fb068a3f3a 
"v=spf1 include:spf.infomaniak.ch -all"
dns_address dns 2a0933dc5c718bf6bb5d849cb1ea5497e6057a09b162bf3b2d42f59b2caf37e0 
"185.125.27.195"
mail_exchanger dns ce070b303a42c5599cd0c7b71400227316c67d3f25f973d8d0f8402c87919e71 
"mta-gw.infomaniak.ch"
02
Documented Change observed

Infrastructure

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 02

Infrastructure

Documented Change observed

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

12evidence
16changes
2open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
12
Signals
4
Changes
16

Unknowns and limitations

2 items still require qualification

dns_nameserver dns 6f77de6c4303242bdf8a0d7befe8d2c4ed4fc243c560f200d1e82f30de785534 
"ns11.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 9dff3868b397222fa8c5f18c2a020ed3a9192bd7166f7adddf06fffab60589d7 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
dmarc_record dns e809572e75a5f245849a7f142c81d1457c8e66e6b29143626c9de3c3671a5efd 
"v=DMARC1; p=reject;"
module_finding dns ee982ef0312e8a10d991bf266b990e03a05f3e1cde38aee3c6bf93a7ddc37f65 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
dns_nameserver dns 4b835c0bff773fb2582a4bdc3e9cdb9bd521c2907a0e03de23fc70fdfb412579 
"ns12.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 46c48c9cec11755627573e52af3785fa29f0e3dda3f6836a40325265ebc05edb 
{
    "evidence": {
        "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.",
        "status": "not_tested"
    },
    "severity": "info"
}
dns_address dns a4962c4c9ec9a4279e0edabbe889e07eb764e3d48da373eee657d09053530d95 
"2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a"
module_finding resilience ae45bf8106b9fcd2367f86162b12fbb754ba43c3d4d5f40214fee20faea66709 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "medium"
}
dependency_provider dependencies a296d4a8efc4874f71bc1fe464a5f88789de358552e5a1679f519fd055a5dcfd 
{
    "critical": true,
    "hosts": [
        "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "id": "infomaniak",
    "known": true,
    "name": "Infomaniak",
    "observation_count": 3,
    "services": [
        "dns",
        "hosting",
        "mail"
    ],
    "tracker": false
}
spf_record dns a892ec0c291fcdfdadc04c4bf3b0f281c6ec85ffb81ec9634717d6fb068a3f3a 
"v=spf1 include:spf.infomaniak.ch -all"
dns_address dns 2a0933dc5c718bf6bb5d849cb1ea5497e6057a09b162bf3b2d42f59b2caf37e0 
"185.125.27.195"
mail_exchanger dns ce070b303a42c5599cd0c7b71400227316c67d3f25f973d8d0f8402c87919e71 
"mta-gw.infomaniak.ch"
03
Documented Change observed

Encryption and transport

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 03

Encryption and transport

Documented Change observed

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

12evidence
16changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
12
Signals
2
Changes
16
tls_issuer tls a3db3ee838d3172fca45705f601cd6712f201f33ca8771b0a354767b1bbc2f05 
"C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = YR1"
http_header headers 94d6e965f5e44267833372e5b16d3c0be1abb498a309ea7ec078462f4e326741 
[
    "same-origin"
]
http_header headers 162b86bbea71c55fda34382a0f462cddf43198e589274cc6b621d3d7c3dc86f7 
[
    "no-referrer"
]
http_header headers 350f1e11bbb7b265483ed592a2ee0a7e5e777ff676238c9a28f7a96959842eae 
[
    "same-origin"
]
http_header headers a5e123719a44f53421fda3dc94848b898460dd4475daa7fd4a3bdc9c568ac49e 
[
    "default-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-HaeTEi9GfJQwkAijTDMtwPCY'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; manifest-src 'self'; worker-src 'self'"
]
module_finding headers 37781e45d8cd90e4398aa6b8f63c68fcd89ebe48bfe083c7444b8b17fbd34627 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "info"
}
http_header headers 60900792a73b88695e222807a4f8f61fbfd5287ef6b41eb7ba5f21dbae1241fe 
[
    "Apache"
]
http_header headers d6fb24c63c4b0d33dab2b80e55aa1c57cc164451a914c22750ba45b242efefb2 
[
    "DENY"
]
http_header headers 89a42fe3d435a586b67587c5fb6be5b96be03644947cd5c0819bcd2d8af891fd 
[
    "nosniff"
]
http_header headers c3e0bbab911bf01494fb02f2f0770d0e88c8615ab13fd9b29d2296b425c63352 
[
    "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()"
]
http_header headers 984e7b6a6b9215f553a476c7659f07468c94d1ae7023d7b7d81452a4d481e6ab 
[
    "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
]
tls_valid_to tls 4bfbad5723a4883eb93eec2c2451c2d3405dcb18c7a726d1554d483cf3c60484 
"2026-12-04T00:03:03+00:00"
04
Documented Change observed

Mail and trust

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 04

Mail and trust

Documented Change observed

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

18evidence
13changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
18
Signals
3
Changes
13
mail_policy_flag mail_trust c3ba349779360435d85174fbfd1424ebe5c43bba8ad290235a0771657752684a 
false
dns_nameserver dns 6f77de6c4303242bdf8a0d7befe8d2c4ed4fc243c560f200d1e82f30de785534 
"ns11.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 9dff3868b397222fa8c5f18c2a020ed3a9192bd7166f7adddf06fffab60589d7 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
dmarc_record dns e809572e75a5f245849a7f142c81d1457c8e66e6b29143626c9de3c3671a5efd 
"v=DMARC1; p=reject;"
mail_policy_flag mail_trust d5fcfeef2e43c54fdf790569cc0337de7b8083dfcb114fb5ce5cfb795b10aeb2 
false
module_finding mail_trust f0eb716e61d3478d7f1271dbe347250e15532b4a9a7a23ea37c9d4b32458025b 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
module_finding dns ee982ef0312e8a10d991bf266b990e03a05f3e1cde38aee3c6bf93a7ddc37f65 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
dmarc_policy mail_trust 4b28ef898b77cac21431675cd1ef881455ed7eed54ba0d2c328cc2111cd4930c 
"reject"
dns_nameserver dns 4b835c0bff773fb2582a4bdc3e9cdb9bd521c2907a0e03de23fc70fdfb412579 
"ns12.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 46c48c9cec11755627573e52af3785fa29f0e3dda3f6836a40325265ebc05edb 
{
    "evidence": {
        "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.",
        "status": "not_tested"
    },
    "severity": "info"
}
dns_address dns a4962c4c9ec9a4279e0edabbe889e07eb764e3d48da373eee657d09053530d95 
"2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a"
spf_policy mail_trust dc73b7c9f02d4e6b2adb40da2f3a9f271488ee889153ae5a7382ea6a76e2ff04 
"hardfail"
module_finding mail_trust 4a17682ff0c2987d9fffb026f4574be9160eaba8dcef993f9a20aa3fb7357987 
{
    "evidence": [
        {
            "host": "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch",
            "priority": 5
        }
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
spf_record dns a892ec0c291fcdfdadc04c4bf3b0f281c6ec85ffb81ec9634717d6fb068a3f3a 
"v=spf1 include:spf.infomaniak.ch -all"
module_finding mail_trust 86dd8c6ac18298a85b91ec7e10910079cbf05badd86d7b9ef39f353099e3b4c4 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
mail_policy_flag mail_trust 6eec1cc28f4263fbcbcc2aa663d09ab5fb677d15847f0366d10e39b5d7fa8a8e 
false
dns_address dns 2a0933dc5c718bf6bb5d849cb1ea5497e6057a09b162bf3b2d42f59b2caf37e0 
"185.125.27.195"
mail_exchanger dns ce070b303a42c5599cd0c7b71400227316c67d3f25f973d8d0f8402c87919e71 
"mta-gw.infomaniak.ch"
05
Documented Change observed

DNS and governance

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 05

DNS and governance

Documented Change observed

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

18evidence
15changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
18
Signals
3
Changes
15
mail_policy_flag mail_trust c3ba349779360435d85174fbfd1424ebe5c43bba8ad290235a0771657752684a 
false
dns_nameserver dns 6f77de6c4303242bdf8a0d7befe8d2c4ed4fc243c560f200d1e82f30de785534 
"ns11.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 9dff3868b397222fa8c5f18c2a020ed3a9192bd7166f7adddf06fffab60589d7 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
dmarc_record dns e809572e75a5f245849a7f142c81d1457c8e66e6b29143626c9de3c3671a5efd 
"v=DMARC1; p=reject;"
mail_policy_flag mail_trust d5fcfeef2e43c54fdf790569cc0337de7b8083dfcb114fb5ce5cfb795b10aeb2 
false
module_finding mail_trust f0eb716e61d3478d7f1271dbe347250e15532b4a9a7a23ea37c9d4b32458025b 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
module_finding dns ee982ef0312e8a10d991bf266b990e03a05f3e1cde38aee3c6bf93a7ddc37f65 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
dmarc_policy mail_trust 4b28ef898b77cac21431675cd1ef881455ed7eed54ba0d2c328cc2111cd4930c 
"reject"
dns_nameserver dns 4b835c0bff773fb2582a4bdc3e9cdb9bd521c2907a0e03de23fc70fdfb412579 
"ns12.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 46c48c9cec11755627573e52af3785fa29f0e3dda3f6836a40325265ebc05edb 
{
    "evidence": {
        "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.",
        "status": "not_tested"
    },
    "severity": "info"
}
dns_address dns a4962c4c9ec9a4279e0edabbe889e07eb764e3d48da373eee657d09053530d95 
"2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a"
spf_policy mail_trust dc73b7c9f02d4e6b2adb40da2f3a9f271488ee889153ae5a7382ea6a76e2ff04 
"hardfail"
module_finding mail_trust 4a17682ff0c2987d9fffb026f4574be9160eaba8dcef993f9a20aa3fb7357987 
{
    "evidence": [
        {
            "host": "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch",
            "priority": 5
        }
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
spf_record dns a892ec0c291fcdfdadc04c4bf3b0f281c6ec85ffb81ec9634717d6fb068a3f3a 
"v=spf1 include:spf.infomaniak.ch -all"
module_finding mail_trust 86dd8c6ac18298a85b91ec7e10910079cbf05badd86d7b9ef39f353099e3b4c4 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
mail_policy_flag mail_trust 6eec1cc28f4263fbcbcc2aa663d09ab5fb677d15847f0366d10e39b5d7fa8a8e 
false
dns_address dns 2a0933dc5c718bf6bb5d849cb1ea5497e6057a09b162bf3b2d42f59b2caf37e0 
"185.125.27.195"
mail_exchanger dns ce070b303a42c5599cd0c7b71400227316c67d3f25f973d8d0f8402c87919e71 
"mta-gw.infomaniak.ch"
06
Documented Change observed

External dependencies

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 06

External dependencies

Documented Change observed

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

12evidence
5changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
12
Signals
4
Changes
5
dns_nameserver dns 6f77de6c4303242bdf8a0d7befe8d2c4ed4fc243c560f200d1e82f30de785534 
"ns11.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 9dff3868b397222fa8c5f18c2a020ed3a9192bd7166f7adddf06fffab60589d7 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
dmarc_record dns e809572e75a5f245849a7f142c81d1457c8e66e6b29143626c9de3c3671a5efd 
"v=DMARC1; p=reject;"
module_finding dns ee982ef0312e8a10d991bf266b990e03a05f3e1cde38aee3c6bf93a7ddc37f65 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
dns_nameserver dns 4b835c0bff773fb2582a4bdc3e9cdb9bd521c2907a0e03de23fc70fdfb412579 
"ns12.infomaniak.ch"
cookie privacy 00963a4e2f8f4d2259192b2352280fa0b8c3a6edb7d497743eb408f8c0728580 
{
    "http_only": true,
    "name": "dimaready_session",
    "same_site": "strict",
    "secure": true
}
module_finding dns 46c48c9cec11755627573e52af3785fa29f0e3dda3f6836a40325265ebc05edb 
{
    "evidence": {
        "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.",
        "status": "not_tested"
    },
    "severity": "info"
}
dns_address dns a4962c4c9ec9a4279e0edabbe889e07eb764e3d48da373eee657d09053530d95 
"2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a"
dependency_provider dependencies a296d4a8efc4874f71bc1fe464a5f88789de358552e5a1679f519fd055a5dcfd 
{
    "critical": true,
    "hosts": [
        "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "id": "infomaniak",
    "known": true,
    "name": "Infomaniak",
    "observation_count": 3,
    "services": [
        "dns",
        "hosting",
        "mail"
    ],
    "tracker": false
}
spf_record dns a892ec0c291fcdfdadc04c4bf3b0f281c6ec85ffb81ec9634717d6fb068a3f3a 
"v=spf1 include:spf.infomaniak.ch -all"
dns_address dns 2a0933dc5c718bf6bb5d849cb1ea5497e6057a09b162bf3b2d42f59b2caf37e0 
"185.125.27.195"
mail_exchanger dns ce070b303a42c5599cd0c7b71400227316c67d3f25f973d8d0f8402c87919e71 
"mta-gw.infomaniak.ch"
07
Documented Change observed

Observable technologies

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 07

Observable technologies

Documented Change observed

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

11evidence
1changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
11
Signals
1
Changes
1
http_header headers 94d6e965f5e44267833372e5b16d3c0be1abb498a309ea7ec078462f4e326741 
[
    "same-origin"
]
http_header headers 162b86bbea71c55fda34382a0f462cddf43198e589274cc6b621d3d7c3dc86f7 
[
    "no-referrer"
]
http_header headers 350f1e11bbb7b265483ed592a2ee0a7e5e777ff676238c9a28f7a96959842eae 
[
    "same-origin"
]
http_header headers a5e123719a44f53421fda3dc94848b898460dd4475daa7fd4a3bdc9c568ac49e 
[
    "default-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-HaeTEi9GfJQwkAijTDMtwPCY'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; manifest-src 'self'; worker-src 'self'"
]
module_finding headers 37781e45d8cd90e4398aa6b8f63c68fcd89ebe48bfe083c7444b8b17fbd34627 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "info"
}
http_header headers 60900792a73b88695e222807a4f8f61fbfd5287ef6b41eb7ba5f21dbae1241fe 
[
    "Apache"
]
http_header headers d6fb24c63c4b0d33dab2b80e55aa1c57cc164451a914c22750ba45b242efefb2 
[
    "DENY"
]
http_header headers 89a42fe3d435a586b67587c5fb6be5b96be03644947cd5c0819bcd2d8af891fd 
[
    "nosniff"
]
http_header headers c3e0bbab911bf01494fb02f2f0770d0e88c8615ab13fd9b29d2296b425c63352 
[
    "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()"
]
http_header headers 984e7b6a6b9215f553a476c7659f07468c94d1ae7023d7b7d81452a4d481e6ab 
[
    "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
]
technology technology 335fb3a1c7fb848edd6de545a4856e26aaa8387cdcbb4f9fcdcd8ea0e1dac792 
{
    "name": "Apache",
    "version": "",
    "version_exposed": false
}
08
Documented Change observed

Public exposure

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 08

Public exposure

Documented Change observed

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

18evidence
10changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
18
Signals
1
Changes
10
module_finding dns 9dff3868b397222fa8c5f18c2a020ed3a9192bd7166f7adddf06fffab60589d7 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
module_finding mail_trust f0eb716e61d3478d7f1271dbe347250e15532b4a9a7a23ea37c9d4b32458025b 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
http_header headers 94d6e965f5e44267833372e5b16d3c0be1abb498a309ea7ec078462f4e326741 
[
    "same-origin"
]
module_finding dns ee982ef0312e8a10d991bf266b990e03a05f3e1cde38aee3c6bf93a7ddc37f65 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
http_header headers 162b86bbea71c55fda34382a0f462cddf43198e589274cc6b621d3d7c3dc86f7 
[
    "no-referrer"
]
http_header headers 350f1e11bbb7b265483ed592a2ee0a7e5e777ff676238c9a28f7a96959842eae 
[
    "same-origin"
]
http_header headers a5e123719a44f53421fda3dc94848b898460dd4475daa7fd4a3bdc9c568ac49e 
[
    "default-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-HaeTEi9GfJQwkAijTDMtwPCY'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; manifest-src 'self'; worker-src 'self'"
]
cookie privacy 00963a4e2f8f4d2259192b2352280fa0b8c3a6edb7d497743eb408f8c0728580 
{
    "http_only": true,
    "name": "dimaready_session",
    "same_site": "strict",
    "secure": true
}
module_finding dns 46c48c9cec11755627573e52af3785fa29f0e3dda3f6836a40325265ebc05edb 
{
    "evidence": {
        "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.",
        "status": "not_tested"
    },
    "severity": "info"
}
module_finding headers 37781e45d8cd90e4398aa6b8f63c68fcd89ebe48bfe083c7444b8b17fbd34627 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "info"
}
module_finding resilience ae45bf8106b9fcd2367f86162b12fbb754ba43c3d4d5f40214fee20faea66709 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "medium"
}
http_header headers 60900792a73b88695e222807a4f8f61fbfd5287ef6b41eb7ba5f21dbae1241fe 
[
    "Apache"
]
http_header headers d6fb24c63c4b0d33dab2b80e55aa1c57cc164451a914c22750ba45b242efefb2 
[
    "DENY"
]
http_header headers 89a42fe3d435a586b67587c5fb6be5b96be03644947cd5c0819bcd2d8af891fd 
[
    "nosniff"
]
module_finding mail_trust 4a17682ff0c2987d9fffb026f4574be9160eaba8dcef993f9a20aa3fb7357987 
{
    "evidence": [
        {
            "host": "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch",
            "priority": 5
        }
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
http_header headers c3e0bbab911bf01494fb02f2f0770d0e88c8615ab13fd9b29d2296b425c63352 
[
    "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()"
]
http_header headers 984e7b6a6b9215f553a476c7659f07468c94d1ae7023d7b7d81452a4d481e6ab 
[
    "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
]
module_finding mail_trust 86dd8c6ac18298a85b91ec7e10910079cbf05badd86d7b9ef39f353099e3b4c4 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
09
Documented Change observed

Documentary trust

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 09

Documentary trust

Documented Change observed

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

17evidence
4changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
17
Signals
1
Changes
4
module_finding dns 9dff3868b397222fa8c5f18c2a020ed3a9192bd7166f7adddf06fffab60589d7 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
module_finding mail_trust f0eb716e61d3478d7f1271dbe347250e15532b4a9a7a23ea37c9d4b32458025b 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
http_header headers 94d6e965f5e44267833372e5b16d3c0be1abb498a309ea7ec078462f4e326741 
[
    "same-origin"
]
module_finding dns ee982ef0312e8a10d991bf266b990e03a05f3e1cde38aee3c6bf93a7ddc37f65 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
http_header headers 162b86bbea71c55fda34382a0f462cddf43198e589274cc6b621d3d7c3dc86f7 
[
    "no-referrer"
]
http_header headers 350f1e11bbb7b265483ed592a2ee0a7e5e777ff676238c9a28f7a96959842eae 
[
    "same-origin"
]
http_header headers a5e123719a44f53421fda3dc94848b898460dd4475daa7fd4a3bdc9c568ac49e 
[
    "default-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-HaeTEi9GfJQwkAijTDMtwPCY'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; manifest-src 'self'; worker-src 'self'"
]
module_finding dns 46c48c9cec11755627573e52af3785fa29f0e3dda3f6836a40325265ebc05edb 
{
    "evidence": {
        "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.",
        "status": "not_tested"
    },
    "severity": "info"
}
module_finding headers 37781e45d8cd90e4398aa6b8f63c68fcd89ebe48bfe083c7444b8b17fbd34627 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "info"
}
module_finding resilience ae45bf8106b9fcd2367f86162b12fbb754ba43c3d4d5f40214fee20faea66709 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "medium"
}
http_header headers 60900792a73b88695e222807a4f8f61fbfd5287ef6b41eb7ba5f21dbae1241fe 
[
    "Apache"
]
http_header headers d6fb24c63c4b0d33dab2b80e55aa1c57cc164451a914c22750ba45b242efefb2 
[
    "DENY"
]
http_header headers 89a42fe3d435a586b67587c5fb6be5b96be03644947cd5c0819bcd2d8af891fd 
[
    "nosniff"
]
module_finding mail_trust 4a17682ff0c2987d9fffb026f4574be9160eaba8dcef993f9a20aa3fb7357987 
{
    "evidence": [
        {
            "host": "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch",
            "priority": 5
        }
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
http_header headers c3e0bbab911bf01494fb02f2f0770d0e88c8615ab13fd9b29d2296b425c63352 
[
    "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()"
]
http_header headers 984e7b6a6b9215f553a476c7659f07468c94d1ae7023d7b7d81452a4d481e6ab 
[
    "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
]
module_finding mail_trust 86dd8c6ac18298a85b91ec7e10910079cbf05badd86d7b9ef39f353099e3b4c4 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
10
Documented Change observed

Security signals

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 10

Security signals

Documented Change observed

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

32evidence
39changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
32
Signals
5
Changes
39
mail_policy_flag mail_trust c3ba349779360435d85174fbfd1424ebe5c43bba8ad290235a0771657752684a 
false
tls_issuer tls a3db3ee838d3172fca45705f601cd6712f201f33ca8771b0a354767b1bbc2f05 
"C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = YR1"
dns_nameserver dns 6f77de6c4303242bdf8a0d7befe8d2c4ed4fc243c560f200d1e82f30de785534 
"ns11.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 9dff3868b397222fa8c5f18c2a020ed3a9192bd7166f7adddf06fffab60589d7 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
dmarc_record dns e809572e75a5f245849a7f142c81d1457c8e66e6b29143626c9de3c3671a5efd 
"v=DMARC1; p=reject;"
mail_policy_flag mail_trust d5fcfeef2e43c54fdf790569cc0337de7b8083dfcb114fb5ce5cfb795b10aeb2 
false
module_finding mail_trust f0eb716e61d3478d7f1271dbe347250e15532b4a9a7a23ea37c9d4b32458025b 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
http_header headers 94d6e965f5e44267833372e5b16d3c0be1abb498a309ea7ec078462f4e326741 
[
    "same-origin"
]
module_finding dns ee982ef0312e8a10d991bf266b990e03a05f3e1cde38aee3c6bf93a7ddc37f65 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
http_header headers 162b86bbea71c55fda34382a0f462cddf43198e589274cc6b621d3d7c3dc86f7 
[
    "no-referrer"
]
http_header headers 350f1e11bbb7b265483ed592a2ee0a7e5e777ff676238c9a28f7a96959842eae 
[
    "same-origin"
]
http_header headers a5e123719a44f53421fda3dc94848b898460dd4475daa7fd4a3bdc9c568ac49e 
[
    "default-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-HaeTEi9GfJQwkAijTDMtwPCY'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; manifest-src 'self'; worker-src 'self'"
]
dmarc_policy mail_trust 4b28ef898b77cac21431675cd1ef881455ed7eed54ba0d2c328cc2111cd4930c 
"reject"
dns_nameserver dns 4b835c0bff773fb2582a4bdc3e9cdb9bd521c2907a0e03de23fc70fdfb412579 
"ns12.infomaniak.ch"
cookie privacy 00963a4e2f8f4d2259192b2352280fa0b8c3a6edb7d497743eb408f8c0728580 
{
    "http_only": true,
    "name": "dimaready_session",
    "same_site": "strict",
    "secure": true
}
module_finding dns 46c48c9cec11755627573e52af3785fa29f0e3dda3f6836a40325265ebc05edb 
{
    "evidence": {
        "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.",
        "status": "not_tested"
    },
    "severity": "info"
}
module_finding headers 37781e45d8cd90e4398aa6b8f63c68fcd89ebe48bfe083c7444b8b17fbd34627 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "info"
}
dns_address dns a4962c4c9ec9a4279e0edabbe889e07eb764e3d48da373eee657d09053530d95 
"2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a"
module_finding resilience ae45bf8106b9fcd2367f86162b12fbb754ba43c3d4d5f40214fee20faea66709 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "medium"
}
http_header headers 60900792a73b88695e222807a4f8f61fbfd5287ef6b41eb7ba5f21dbae1241fe 
[
    "Apache"
]
http_header headers d6fb24c63c4b0d33dab2b80e55aa1c57cc164451a914c22750ba45b242efefb2 
[
    "DENY"
]
http_header headers 89a42fe3d435a586b67587c5fb6be5b96be03644947cd5c0819bcd2d8af891fd 
[
    "nosniff"
]
spf_policy mail_trust dc73b7c9f02d4e6b2adb40da2f3a9f271488ee889153ae5a7382ea6a76e2ff04 
"hardfail"
module_finding mail_trust 4a17682ff0c2987d9fffb026f4574be9160eaba8dcef993f9a20aa3fb7357987 
{
    "evidence": [
        {
            "host": "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch",
            "priority": 5
        }
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
11
To determine First observation

Evolution over time

This angle still needs additional public evidence

Angle 11

Evolution over time

To determine First observation

This angle still needs additional public evidence

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

0evidence
64changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
0
Signals
0
Changes
64
12
Documented Stable

Evidence and traceability

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

Angle 12

Evidence and traceability

Documented Stable

Public evidence provides enough material to document this angle

01

Why it matters

This angle matters because it helps turn isolated public signals into information that can support a decision.

02

How to read it

Scanapse relates public observations, evidence and changes while keeping facts separate from interpretation.

03

What it is for

Provide a usable reading for technical teams, decision-makers and governance roles without exposing unnecessary internal mechanics.

04

What it does not prove

Public evidence is limited to the observed scope and does not prove internal, contractual or unobserved properties.

Material available for this angle

41evidence
0changes
0open questions
Show technical details for this angle

This level supports auditability and reproducibility. It is not required to understand the main reading.

Mapping version
2.3.1
Evidence
41
Signals
7
Changes
0
mail_policy_flag mail_trust c3ba349779360435d85174fbfd1424ebe5c43bba8ad290235a0771657752684a 
false
tls_issuer tls a3db3ee838d3172fca45705f601cd6712f201f33ca8771b0a354767b1bbc2f05 
"C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = YR1"
dns_nameserver dns 6f77de6c4303242bdf8a0d7befe8d2c4ed4fc243c560f200d1e82f30de785534 
"ns11.infomaniak.ch"
module_finding dns 9dff3868b397222fa8c5f18c2a020ed3a9192bd7166f7adddf06fffab60589d7 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}
dmarc_record dns e809572e75a5f245849a7f142c81d1457c8e66e6b29143626c9de3c3671a5efd 
"v=DMARC1; p=reject;"
dnssec_evidence dnssec_depth a366852c5926972b21d257968275e36215634f3f0f63f37ff2d275c7a40ddd6d 
{
    "chain_consistency": {
        "reason": "insufficient_record_evidence",
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "dnskey": {
        "query_supported": false,
        "records": [],
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "ds": {
        "query_supported": false,
        "records": [],
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "validation": {
        "reason": "no_validating_resolver",
        "state": "untested"
    }
}
mail_policy_flag mail_trust d5fcfeef2e43c54fdf790569cc0337de7b8083dfcb114fb5ce5cfb795b10aeb2 
false
module_finding mail_trust f0eb716e61d3478d7f1271dbe347250e15532b4a9a7a23ea37c9d4b32458025b 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
http_header headers 94d6e965f5e44267833372e5b16d3c0be1abb498a309ea7ec078462f4e326741 
[
    "same-origin"
]
module_finding dns ee982ef0312e8a10d991bf266b990e03a05f3e1cde38aee3c6bf93a7ddc37f65 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}
http_header headers 162b86bbea71c55fda34382a0f462cddf43198e589274cc6b621d3d7c3dc86f7 
[
    "no-referrer"
]
http_header headers 350f1e11bbb7b265483ed592a2ee0a7e5e777ff676238c9a28f7a96959842eae 
[
    "same-origin"
]
mail_transport_evidence mail_transport a9d0055872bf8c9f58e07b9dda6c399f3fbf870763d4cbd466a1a3f4b12f3ad4 
{
    "bimi": {
        "records": [],
        "state": "not_observed"
    },
    "dane_tlsa": {
        "query_supported": false,
        "reason": "tlsa_query_not_available",
        "records": [],
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "dkim": {
        "reason": "no_selector_bruteforce",
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "mta_sts": {
        "policy": null,
        "policy_state": "untested",
        "records": [],
        "state": "not_observed"
    },
    "tls_rpt": {
        "records": [],
        "state": "not_observed"
    }
}
post_quantum_tls pq_tls_probe e97aba8d5d760e668edea875951b311dd12951f06d3ae3f0648d24404408b48b 
{
    "capability": {
        "capable": false,
        "groups": [],
        "reason": "proc_open_unavailable"
    },
    "group": null,
    "reason": "client_capability_unavailable",
    "state": "untested"
}
canary_signal canary_passive 446cf7af5e15199c3195ab0f40688c34d2c6557a48c6aeadeb0fedeaa8df5b19 
{
    "matches": [],
    "reason": "no_known_passive_signature_observed",
    "signature_version": "2026.09.1",
    "state": "not_observed"
}
http_header headers a5e123719a44f53421fda3dc94848b898460dd4475daa7fd4a3bdc9c568ac49e 
[
    "default-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-HaeTEi9GfJQwkAijTDMtwPCY'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; manifest-src 'self'; worker-src 'self'"
]
dmarc_policy mail_trust 4b28ef898b77cac21431675cd1ef881455ed7eed54ba0d2c328cc2111cd4930c 
"reject"
dns_nameserver dns 4b835c0bff773fb2582a4bdc3e9cdb9bd521c2907a0e03de23fc70fdfb412579 
"ns12.infomaniak.ch"
cookie privacy 00963a4e2f8f4d2259192b2352280fa0b8c3a6edb7d497743eb408f8c0728580 
{
    "http_only": true,
    "name": "dimaready_session",
    "same_site": "strict",
    "secure": true
}
module_finding dns 46c48c9cec11755627573e52af3785fa29f0e3dda3f6836a40325265ebc05edb 
{
    "evidence": {
        "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.",
        "status": "not_tested"
    },
    "severity": "info"
}
module_finding headers 37781e45d8cd90e4398aa6b8f63c68fcd89ebe48bfe083c7444b8b17fbd34627 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "info"
}
dns_address dns a4962c4c9ec9a4279e0edabbe889e07eb764e3d48da373eee657d09053530d95 
"2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a"
module_finding resilience ae45bf8106b9fcd2367f86162b12fbb754ba43c3d4d5f40214fee20faea66709 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "medium"
}
http_header headers 60900792a73b88695e222807a4f8f61fbfd5287ef6b41eb7ba5f21dbae1241fe 
[
    "Apache"
]

Overview

What the domain already shows, and what still needs clarification

An overview of visible relationships and uncertainty areas that still need verification.

Visible relations

Visible relations around the domain

Relations are grouped by function. They describe what is publicly visible, not contracts or the full internal architecture.

Observed domain dimaready.com

DNS

2
DNS server Observed

ns11.infomaniak.ch

DNS server Observed

ns12.infomaniak.ch

mail

1
Mail server Observed

mta-gw.infomaniak.ch

technology

1
Observed technology Observed

Apache

external resources

1
External provider or resource Corroborated

Infomaniak

Open questions

2 areas to confirm

An unknown becomes useful information when it precisely explains what is missing to reach a conclusion.

To confirm

Origin hosting

An edge service does not reveal the origin hosting provider.

To confirm

Effective data location

Public provider metadata does not prove where data is actually processed.

These items do not mean there is a problem. They simply show that useful information is still missing.

Sources and evidence

Evidence supporting this reading

41 evidence items are available. They remain collapsed to preserve a short reading and can be explored on demand.

41evidence items available

Each proof keeps its method, provenance, date, reliability and interpretation limits.

Download evidence JSON
Explore evidence
#01 Mail-related public records

Evidence: mail_policy_flag

Public mail policies show how the domain frames sending, authentication and email transport.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

These mechanisms can reduce domain spoofing and document mail-transport posture.

What to check next

Relate SPF, DKIM when a selector is known, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT. Compare policy changes over time.

Possible action

Before strengthening a policy, inventory legitimate mail flows and verify alignment. Roll out changes progressively to avoid blocking authorized senders.

Observation
Understand
Public DNS and policy endpoint inspection
Source
Mail-related public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe published mail authentication and transport policies
What this does not prove
They do not prove actual deliverability, every recipient’s behavior, or the absence of phishing.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#02 Public TLS endpoint

Evidence: tls_issuer

TLS protects the observed connection between the scanner and the public service.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

These elements document public-channel protection and the cryptographic mechanisms actually negotiated.

What to check next

Compare negotiated protocol, issuer, expiry, chain and cryptographic parameters with history. Check other public entry points separately.

Possible action

Address only observed gaps such as an expiring certificate, invalid chain, or unwanted protocol. Test changes in a controlled environment before deployment.

Observation
C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = YR1
Understand
TLS handshake and public certificate inspection
Source
Public TLS endpoint
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe the TLS session and certificate presented to Scanapse
What this does not prove
Strong TLS does not prove application security or origin-server security behind a CDN or reverse proxy.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

Verify it yourself

This command reproduces the public observation without changing the target.

openssl s_client -connect dimaready.com:443 -servername dimaready.com </dev/null
View raw data 
C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = YR1

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#03 DNS public records

Evidence: dns_nameserver

DNS shows how a domain resolves and which public services are associated with it.

Passive High
Why it matters

Consistent, verifiable resolution reduces some spoofing risks and helps explain entity dependencies.

What to check next

Compare NS, A/AAAA, MX, CAA and the DNSSEC chain with previous measurements to identify delegation or operator changes.

Possible action

If a change is unexpected, verify registrar and DNS-provider configuration before modifying anything. Document the failover mechanisms that actually exist.

Observation
ns11.infomaniak.ch
Understand
Standard DNS resolution and record parsing
Source
DNS public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe public DNS data observed at scan time
What this does not prove
Public DNS does not prove physical server location, contracts, or global availability.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

Verify it yourself

This command reproduces the public observation without changing the target.

dig NS dimaready.com
View raw data 
ns11.infomaniak.ch

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#04 DNS public records

Evidence: module_finding

DNS shows how a domain resolves and which public services are associated with it.

Passive High
Why it matters

Consistent, verifiable resolution reduces some spoofing risks and helps explain entity dependencies.

What to check next

Compare NS, A/AAAA, MX, CAA and the DNSSEC chain with previous measurements to identify delegation or operator changes.

Possible action

If a change is unexpected, verify registrar and DNS-provider configuration before modifying anything. Document the failover mechanisms that actually exist.

Observation
{ "evidence": [ "ns11.infomaniak.ch", "ns12.infomaniak.ch" ], "severity": "low" }
Understand
Standard DNS resolution and record parsing
Source
DNS public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe public DNS data observed at scan time
What this does not prove
Public DNS does not prove physical server location, contracts, or global availability.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#05 DNS public records

Evidence: dmarc_record

DNS shows how a domain resolves and which public services are associated with it.

Passive High
Why it matters

Consistent, verifiable resolution reduces some spoofing risks and helps explain entity dependencies.

What to check next

Compare NS, A/AAAA, MX, CAA and the DNSSEC chain with previous measurements to identify delegation or operator changes.

Possible action

If a change is unexpected, verify registrar and DNS-provider configuration before modifying anything. Document the failover mechanisms that actually exist.

Observation
v=DMARC1; p=reject;
Understand
Standard DNS resolution and record parsing
Source
DNS public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe public DNS data observed at scan time
What this does not prove
Public DNS does not prove physical server location, contracts, or global availability.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
v=DMARC1; p=reject;

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#06 dnssec_evidence

Evidence: dnssec_evidence

Scanapse shows visible providers and third-party services on which the public service depends.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

Concentration on one actor or many third parties can affect continuity and governance.

What to check next

Identify each provider role, functions concentrated on the same actor, and dependencies that appeared or disappeared since the previous scan.

Possible action

For a critical dependency, document owner, contract, reversibility, failover and rationale. Diversify only after analysing the actual need.

Observation
{ "chain_consistency": { "reason": "insufficient_record_evidence", "state": "untested" }, "dnskey": { "query_supported": false, "records": [], "state": "untested" }, "ds": { "query_supported": false, "records": [], "state": "untested" }, "validation": { "reason": "no_validating_resolver", "state": "untested" } }
Understand
Public observation
Source
dnssec_evidence
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe the observed public artefact
What this does not prove
A visible dependency does not prove data location, actual contractual jurisdiction, or hidden subcontractors.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "chain_consistency": {
        "reason": "insufficient_record_evidence",
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "dnskey": {
        "query_supported": false,
        "records": [],
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "ds": {
        "query_supported": false,
        "records": [],
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "validation": {
        "reason": "no_validating_resolver",
        "state": "untested"
    }
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#07 Mail-related public records

Evidence: mail_policy_flag

Public mail policies show how the domain frames sending, authentication and email transport.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

These mechanisms can reduce domain spoofing and document mail-transport posture.

What to check next

Relate SPF, DKIM when a selector is known, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT. Compare policy changes over time.

Possible action

Before strengthening a policy, inventory legitimate mail flows and verify alignment. Roll out changes progressively to avoid blocking authorized senders.

Observation
Understand
Public DNS and policy endpoint inspection
Source
Mail-related public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe published mail authentication and transport policies
What this does not prove
They do not prove actual deliverability, every recipient’s behavior, or the absence of phishing.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#08 Mail-related public records

Evidence: module_finding

Public mail policies show how the domain frames sending, authentication and email transport.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

These mechanisms can reduce domain spoofing and document mail-transport posture.

What to check next

Relate SPF, DKIM when a selector is known, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT. Compare policy changes over time.

Possible action

Before strengthening a policy, inventory legitimate mail flows and verify alignment. Roll out changes progressively to avoid blocking authorized senders.

Observation
{ "evidence": null, "severity": "low" }
Understand
Public DNS and policy endpoint inspection
Source
Mail-related public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe published mail authentication and transport policies
What this does not prove
They do not prove actual deliverability, every recipient’s behavior, or the absence of phishing.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#09 Public HTTP response

Evidence: http_header

HTTP headers can ask the browser to enforce specific protections.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

They are visible, verifiable browser-side defensive layers.

What to check next

Read each full policy, identify permissive or contradictory directives, and compare responses across the main public routes.

Possible action

Harden policies progressively from actual application needs. Avoid copying generic templates without functional testing.

Observation
[ "same-origin" ]
Understand
HTTP response-header inspection
Source
Public HTTP response
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe defensive policies declared on the observed response
What this does not prove
A header being present does not prove it is optimal or that the application has no vulnerabilities.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
[
    "same-origin"
]

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#10 DNS public records

Evidence: module_finding

DNS shows how a domain resolves and which public services are associated with it.

Passive High
Why it matters

Consistent, verifiable resolution reduces some spoofing risks and helps explain entity dependencies.

What to check next

Compare NS, A/AAAA, MX, CAA and the DNSSEC chain with previous measurements to identify delegation or operator changes.

Possible action

If a change is unexpected, verify registrar and DNS-provider configuration before modifying anything. Document the failover mechanisms that actually exist.

Observation
{ "evidence": null, "severity": "low" }
Understand
Standard DNS resolution and record parsing
Source
DNS public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe public DNS data observed at scan time
What this does not prove
Public DNS does not prove physical server location, contracts, or global availability.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#11 Public HTTP response

Evidence: http_header

HTTP headers can ask the browser to enforce specific protections.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

They are visible, verifiable browser-side defensive layers.

What to check next

Read each full policy, identify permissive or contradictory directives, and compare responses across the main public routes.

Possible action

Harden policies progressively from actual application needs. Avoid copying generic templates without functional testing.

Observation
[ "no-referrer" ]
Understand
HTTP response-header inspection
Source
Public HTTP response
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe defensive policies declared on the observed response
What this does not prove
A header being present does not prove it is optimal or that the application has no vulnerabilities.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
[
    "no-referrer"
]

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#12 Public HTTP response

Evidence: http_header

HTTP headers can ask the browser to enforce specific protections.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

They are visible, verifiable browser-side defensive layers.

What to check next

Read each full policy, identify permissive or contradictory directives, and compare responses across the main public routes.

Possible action

Harden policies progressively from actual application needs. Avoid copying generic templates without functional testing.

Observation
[ "same-origin" ]
Understand
HTTP response-header inspection
Source
Public HTTP response
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe defensive policies declared on the observed response
What this does not prove
A header being present does not prove it is optimal or that the application has no vulnerabilities.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
[
    "same-origin"
]

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#13 mail_transport_evidence

Evidence: mail_transport_evidence

Scanapse shows visible providers and third-party services on which the public service depends.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

Concentration on one actor or many third parties can affect continuity and governance.

What to check next

Identify each provider role, functions concentrated on the same actor, and dependencies that appeared or disappeared since the previous scan.

Possible action

For a critical dependency, document owner, contract, reversibility, failover and rationale. Diversify only after analysing the actual need.

Observation
{ "bimi": { "records": [], "state": "not_observed" }, "dane_tlsa": { "query_supported": false, "reason": "tlsa_query_not_available", "records": [], "state": "untested" }, "dkim": { "reason": "no_selector_bruteforce", "state": "untested" }, "mta_sts": { "policy": null, "policy_state": "untested", "records": [], "state": "not_observed" }, "tls_rpt": { "records": [], "state": "not_observed" } }
Understand
Public observation
Source
mail_transport_evidence
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe the observed public artefact
What this does not prove
A visible dependency does not prove data location, actual contractual jurisdiction, or hidden subcontractors.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "bimi": {
        "records": [],
        "state": "not_observed"
    },
    "dane_tlsa": {
        "query_supported": false,
        "reason": "tlsa_query_not_available",
        "records": [],
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "dkim": {
        "reason": "no_selector_bruteforce",
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "mta_sts": {
        "policy": null,
        "policy_state": "untested",
        "records": [],
        "state": "not_observed"
    },
    "tls_rpt": {
        "records": [],
        "state": "not_observed"
    }
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#14 post_quantum_tls

Evidence: post_quantum_tls

This check only looks for a public TLS termination negotiating a hybrid key exchange supported by Scanapse.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

It documents cryptographic readiness without confusing it with overall system security.

What to check next

Record the actually negotiated group, tested endpoint, and measurement-client version. Compare results over time and across other public frontends.

Possible action

Do not enable or disable a mechanism merely to obtain a badge. Assess compatibility, TLS termination, clients and cryptographic strategy before changing it.

Observation
{ "capability": { "capable": false, "groups": [], "reason": "proc_open_unavailable" }, "group": null, "reason": "client_capability_unavailable", "state": "untested" }
Understand
Public observation
Source
post_quantum_tls
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe the observed public artefact
What this does not prove
A positive result does not make a site “post-quantum”, and a negative result does not prove no other client could negotiate it.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "capability": {
        "capable": false,
        "groups": [],
        "reason": "proc_open_unavailable"
    },
    "group": null,
    "reason": "client_capability_unavailable",
    "state": "untested"
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#15 canary_signal

Evidence: canary_signal

Scanapse shows visible providers and third-party services on which the public service depends.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

Concentration on one actor or many third parties can affect continuity and governance.

What to check next

Identify each provider role, functions concentrated on the same actor, and dependencies that appeared or disappeared since the previous scan.

Possible action

For a critical dependency, document owner, contract, reversibility, failover and rationale. Diversify only after analysing the actual need.

Observation
{ "matches": [], "reason": "no_known_passive_signature_observed", "signature_version": "2026.09.1", "state": "not_observed" }
Understand
Public observation
Source
canary_signal
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe the observed public artefact
What this does not prove
A visible dependency does not prove data location, actual contractual jurisdiction, or hidden subcontractors.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "matches": [],
    "reason": "no_known_passive_signature_observed",
    "signature_version": "2026.09.1",
    "state": "not_observed"
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#16 Public HTTP response

Evidence: http_header

HTTP headers can ask the browser to enforce specific protections.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

They are visible, verifiable browser-side defensive layers.

What to check next

Read each full policy, identify permissive or contradictory directives, and compare responses across the main public routes.

Possible action

Harden policies progressively from actual application needs. Avoid copying generic templates without functional testing.

Observation
[ "default-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-HaeTEi9GfJQwkAijTDMtwPCY'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; manifest-src 'self'; worker-src 'self'" ]
Understand
HTTP response-header inspection
Source
Public HTTP response
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe defensive policies declared on the observed response
What this does not prove
A header being present does not prove it is optimal or that the application has no vulnerabilities.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
[
    "default-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-HaeTEi9GfJQwkAijTDMtwPCY'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; manifest-src 'self'; worker-src 'self'"
]

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#17 Mail-related public records

Evidence: dmarc_policy

Public mail policies show how the domain frames sending, authentication and email transport.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

These mechanisms can reduce domain spoofing and document mail-transport posture.

What to check next

Relate SPF, DKIM when a selector is known, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT. Compare policy changes over time.

Possible action

Before strengthening a policy, inventory legitimate mail flows and verify alignment. Roll out changes progressively to avoid blocking authorized senders.

Observation
reject
Understand
Public DNS and policy endpoint inspection
Source
Mail-related public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe published mail authentication and transport policies
What this does not prove
They do not prove actual deliverability, every recipient’s behavior, or the absence of phishing.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

Verify it yourself

This command reproduces the public observation without changing the target.

dig TXT _dmarc.dimaready.com
View raw data 
reject

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#18 DNS public records

Evidence: dns_nameserver

DNS shows how a domain resolves and which public services are associated with it.

Passive High
Why it matters

Consistent, verifiable resolution reduces some spoofing risks and helps explain entity dependencies.

What to check next

Compare NS, A/AAAA, MX, CAA and the DNSSEC chain with previous measurements to identify delegation or operator changes.

Possible action

If a change is unexpected, verify registrar and DNS-provider configuration before modifying anything. Document the failover mechanisms that actually exist.

Observation
ns12.infomaniak.ch
Understand
Standard DNS resolution and record parsing
Source
DNS public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe public DNS data observed at scan time
What this does not prove
Public DNS does not prove physical server location, contracts, or global availability.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

Verify it yourself

This command reproduces the public observation without changing the target.

dig NS dimaready.com
View raw data 
ns12.infomaniak.ch

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#19 Observed public page

Evidence: cookie

Scanapse describes only privacy signals visible on the observed public journey.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

This separates what the browser actually encounters from what cannot be measured externally.

What to check next

Relate visible cookies and third parties to actual features, then compare those observations with internal documentation when the organisation has it.

Possible action

Remove unnecessary trackers or cookies and document the purposes of required elements. Any legal assessment must remain separate from the external scan.

Observation
{ "http_only": true, "name": "dimaready_session", "same_site": "strict", "secure": true }
Understand
Visible cookies and tracker signatures on the public response
Source
Observed public page
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe visible privacy-related signals
What this does not prove
This observation is never a GDPR audit and does not reveal every purpose or internal processing activity.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "http_only": true,
    "name": "dimaready_session",
    "same_site": "strict",
    "secure": true
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#20 DNS public records

Evidence: module_finding

DNS shows how a domain resolves and which public services are associated with it.

Passive High
Why it matters

Consistent, verifiable resolution reduces some spoofing risks and helps explain entity dependencies.

What to check next

Compare NS, A/AAAA, MX, CAA and the DNSSEC chain with previous measurements to identify delegation or operator changes.

Possible action

If a change is unexpected, verify registrar and DNS-provider configuration before modifying anything. Document the failover mechanisms that actually exist.

Observation
{ "evidence": { "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.", "status": "not_tested" }, "severity": "info" }
Understand
Standard DNS resolution and record parsing
Source
DNS public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe public DNS data observed at scan time
What this does not prove
Public DNS does not prove physical server location, contracts, or global availability.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "evidence": {
        "reason": "No external validating resolver is used; cryptographic validation is intentionally not inferred.",
        "status": "not_tested"
    },
    "severity": "info"
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#21 Public HTTP response

Evidence: module_finding

HTTP headers can ask the browser to enforce specific protections.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

They are visible, verifiable browser-side defensive layers.

What to check next

Read each full policy, identify permissive or contradictory directives, and compare responses across the main public routes.

Possible action

Harden policies progressively from actual application needs. Avoid copying generic templates without functional testing.

Observation
{ "evidence": null, "severity": "info" }
Understand
HTTP response-header inspection
Source
Public HTTP response
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe defensive policies declared on the observed response
What this does not prove
A header being present does not prove it is optimal or that the application has no vulnerabilities.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "info"
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#22 DNS public records

Evidence: dns_address

DNS shows how a domain resolves and which public services are associated with it.

Passive High
Why it matters

Consistent, verifiable resolution reduces some spoofing risks and helps explain entity dependencies.

What to check next

Compare NS, A/AAAA, MX, CAA and the DNSSEC chain with previous measurements to identify delegation or operator changes.

Possible action

If a change is unexpected, verify registrar and DNS-provider configuration before modifying anything. Document the failover mechanisms that actually exist.

Observation
2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a
Understand
Standard DNS resolution and record parsing
Source
DNS public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe public DNS data observed at scan time
What this does not prove
Public DNS does not prove physical server location, contracts, or global availability.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

Verify it yourself

This command reproduces the public observation without changing the target.

dig A dimaready.com && dig AAAA dimaready.com
View raw data 
2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#23 module_finding

Evidence: module_finding

Scanapse shows visible providers and third-party services on which the public service depends.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

Concentration on one actor or many third parties can affect continuity and governance.

What to check next

Identify each provider role, functions concentrated on the same actor, and dependencies that appeared or disappeared since the previous scan.

Possible action

For a critical dependency, document owner, contract, reversibility, failover and rationale. Diversify only after analysing the actual need.

Observation
{ "evidence": [ "ns11.infomaniak.ch", "ns12.infomaniak.ch" ], "severity": "medium" }
Understand
Public observation
Source
module_finding
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe the observed public artefact
What this does not prove
A visible dependency does not prove data location, actual contractual jurisdiction, or hidden subcontractors.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "evidence": [
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "severity": "medium"
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#24 Public HTTP response

Evidence: http_header

HTTP headers can ask the browser to enforce specific protections.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

They are visible, verifiable browser-side defensive layers.

What to check next

Read each full policy, identify permissive or contradictory directives, and compare responses across the main public routes.

Possible action

Harden policies progressively from actual application needs. Avoid copying generic templates without functional testing.

Observation
[ "Apache" ]
Understand
HTTP response-header inspection
Source
Public HTTP response
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe defensive policies declared on the observed response
What this does not prove
A header being present does not prove it is optimal or that the application has no vulnerabilities.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
[
    "Apache"
]

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#25 Public HTTP response

Evidence: http_header

HTTP headers can ask the browser to enforce specific protections.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

They are visible, verifiable browser-side defensive layers.

What to check next

Read each full policy, identify permissive or contradictory directives, and compare responses across the main public routes.

Possible action

Harden policies progressively from actual application needs. Avoid copying generic templates without functional testing.

Observation
[ "DENY" ]
Understand
HTTP response-header inspection
Source
Public HTTP response
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe defensive policies declared on the observed response
What this does not prove
A header being present does not prove it is optimal or that the application has no vulnerabilities.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
[
    "DENY"
]

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#26 Public HTTP response

Evidence: http_header

HTTP headers can ask the browser to enforce specific protections.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

They are visible, verifiable browser-side defensive layers.

What to check next

Read each full policy, identify permissive or contradictory directives, and compare responses across the main public routes.

Possible action

Harden policies progressively from actual application needs. Avoid copying generic templates without functional testing.

Observation
[ "nosniff" ]
Understand
HTTP response-header inspection
Source
Public HTTP response
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe defensive policies declared on the observed response
What this does not prove
A header being present does not prove it is optimal or that the application has no vulnerabilities.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
[
    "nosniff"
]

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#27 Mail-related public records

Evidence: spf_policy

Public mail policies show how the domain frames sending, authentication and email transport.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

These mechanisms can reduce domain spoofing and document mail-transport posture.

What to check next

Relate SPF, DKIM when a selector is known, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT. Compare policy changes over time.

Possible action

Before strengthening a policy, inventory legitimate mail flows and verify alignment. Roll out changes progressively to avoid blocking authorized senders.

Observation
hardfail
Understand
Public DNS and policy endpoint inspection
Source
Mail-related public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe published mail authentication and transport policies
What this does not prove
They do not prove actual deliverability, every recipient’s behavior, or the absence of phishing.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

Verify it yourself

This command reproduces the public observation without changing the target.

dig TXT dimaready.com
View raw data 
hardfail

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#28 Mail-related public records

Evidence: module_finding

Public mail policies show how the domain frames sending, authentication and email transport.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

These mechanisms can reduce domain spoofing and document mail-transport posture.

What to check next

Relate SPF, DKIM when a selector is known, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT. Compare policy changes over time.

Possible action

Before strengthening a policy, inventory legitimate mail flows and verify alignment. Roll out changes progressively to avoid blocking authorized senders.

Observation
{ "evidence": [ { "host": "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch", "priority": 5 } ], "severity": "low" }
Understand
Public DNS and policy endpoint inspection
Source
Mail-related public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe published mail authentication and transport policies
What this does not prove
They do not prove actual deliverability, every recipient’s behavior, or the absence of phishing.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "evidence": [
        {
            "host": "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch",
            "priority": 5
        }
    ],
    "severity": "low"
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#29 Public HTTP response

Evidence: http_header

HTTP headers can ask the browser to enforce specific protections.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

They are visible, verifiable browser-side defensive layers.

What to check next

Read each full policy, identify permissive or contradictory directives, and compare responses across the main public routes.

Possible action

Harden policies progressively from actual application needs. Avoid copying generic templates without functional testing.

Observation
[ "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()" ]
Understand
HTTP response-header inspection
Source
Public HTTP response
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe defensive policies declared on the observed response
What this does not prove
A header being present does not prove it is optimal or that the application has no vulnerabilities.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
[
    "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()"
]

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#30 modern_transport_evidence

Evidence: modern_transport_evidence

Scanapse shows visible providers and third-party services on which the public service depends.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

Concentration on one actor or many third parties can affect continuity and governance.

What to check next

Identify each provider role, functions concentrated on the same actor, and dependencies that appeared or disappeared since the previous scan.

Possible action

For a critical dependency, document owner, contract, reversibility, failover and rationale. Diversify only after analysing the actual need.

Observation
{ "alpn": { "state": "untested", "value": "" }, "certificate": { "cipher": "", "issuer": "C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = YR1", "protocol": "", "san_count": 0, "state": "observed", "valid_from": "2026-09-05T00:03:04+00:00", "valid_to": "2026-12-04T00:03:03+00:00" }, "http2": { "negotiated": "3", "state": "untested" }, "http3_advertised": { "alt_svc": "", "state": "not_observed" }, "ipv4": { "addresses": [ "185.125.27.195" ], "state": "observed" }, "ipv6": { "addresses": [ "2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a" ], "state": "observed" } }
Understand
Public observation
Source
modern_transport_evidence
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe the observed public artefact
What this does not prove
A visible dependency does not prove data location, actual contractual jurisdiction, or hidden subcontractors.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "alpn": {
        "state": "untested",
        "value": ""
    },
    "certificate": {
        "cipher": "",
        "issuer": "C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = YR1",
        "protocol": "",
        "san_count": 0,
        "state": "observed",
        "valid_from": "2026-09-05T00:03:04+00:00",
        "valid_to": "2026-12-04T00:03:03+00:00"
    },
    "http2": {
        "negotiated": "3",
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "http3_advertised": {
        "alt_svc": "",
        "state": "not_observed"
    },
    "ipv4": {
        "addresses": [
            "185.125.27.195"
        ],
        "state": "observed"
    },
    "ipv6": {
        "addresses": [
            "2001:1600::aaaa:0:0:80:5a"
        ],
        "state": "observed"
    }
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#31 Observed public resources

Evidence: dependency_provider

Scanapse shows visible providers and third-party services on which the public service depends.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

Concentration on one actor or many third parties can affect continuity and governance.

What to check next

Identify each provider role, functions concentrated on the same actor, and dependencies that appeared or disappeared since the previous scan.

Possible action

For a critical dependency, document owner, contract, reversibility, failover and rationale. Diversify only after analysing the actual need.

Observation
{ "critical": true, "hosts": [ "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch", "ns11.infomaniak.ch", "ns12.infomaniak.ch" ], "id": "infomaniak", "known": true, "name": "Infomaniak", "observation_count": 3, "services": [ "dns", "hosting", "mail" ], "tracker": false }
Understand
Public HTML/resource dependency extraction and provider matching
Source
Observed public resources
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe visible third-party dependencies
What this does not prove
A visible dependency does not prove data location, actual contractual jurisdiction, or hidden subcontractors.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "critical": true,
    "hosts": [
        "mta-gw.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns11.infomaniak.ch",
        "ns12.infomaniak.ch"
    ],
    "id": "infomaniak",
    "known": true,
    "name": "Infomaniak",
    "observation_count": 3,
    "services": [
        "dns",
        "hosting",
        "mail"
    ],
    "tracker": false
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#32 csp_evidence

Evidence: csp_evidence

Scanapse shows visible providers and third-party services on which the public service depends.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

Concentration on one actor or many third parties can affect continuity and governance.

What to check next

Identify each provider role, functions concentrated on the same actor, and dependencies that appeared or disappeared since the previous scan.

Possible action

For a critical dependency, document owner, contract, reversibility, failover and rationale. Diversify only after analysing the actual need.

Observation
{ "enforced": true, "frame_ancestors": true, "hash_present": false, "nonce_present": true, "object_src": true, "report_only": false, "reporting_endpoint": false, "state": "observed", "strict_dynamic": false, "trusted_types": false }
Understand
Public observation
Source
csp_evidence
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe the observed public artefact
What this does not prove
A visible dependency does not prove data location, actual contractual jurisdiction, or hidden subcontractors.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "enforced": true,
    "frame_ancestors": true,
    "hash_present": false,
    "nonce_present": true,
    "object_src": true,
    "report_only": false,
    "reporting_endpoint": false,
    "state": "observed",
    "strict_dynamic": false,
    "trusted_types": false
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#33 Public HTTP response

Evidence: http_header

HTTP headers can ask the browser to enforce specific protections.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

They are visible, verifiable browser-side defensive layers.

What to check next

Read each full policy, identify permissive or contradictory directives, and compare responses across the main public routes.

Possible action

Harden policies progressively from actual application needs. Avoid copying generic templates without functional testing.

Observation
[ "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" ]
Understand
HTTP response-header inspection
Source
Public HTTP response
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe defensive policies declared on the observed response
What this does not prove
A header being present does not prove it is optimal or that the application has no vulnerabilities.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
[
    "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
]

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#34 Public TLS endpoint

Evidence: tls_valid_to

TLS protects the observed connection between the scanner and the public service.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

These elements document public-channel protection and the cryptographic mechanisms actually negotiated.

What to check next

Compare negotiated protocol, issuer, expiry, chain and cryptographic parameters with history. Check other public entry points separately.

Possible action

Address only observed gaps such as an expiring certificate, invalid chain, or unwanted protocol. Test changes in a controlled environment before deployment.

Observation
2026-12-04T00:03:03+00:00
Understand
TLS handshake and public certificate inspection
Source
Public TLS endpoint
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe the TLS session and certificate presented to Scanapse
What this does not prove
Strong TLS does not prove application security or origin-server security behind a CDN or reverse proxy.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
2026-12-04T00:03:03+00:00

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#35 technology

Evidence: technology

Scanapse shows visible providers and third-party services on which the public service depends.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

Concentration on one actor or many third parties can affect continuity and governance.

What to check next

Identify each provider role, functions concentrated on the same actor, and dependencies that appeared or disappeared since the previous scan.

Possible action

For a critical dependency, document owner, contract, reversibility, failover and rationale. Diversify only after analysing the actual need.

Observation
{ "name": "Apache", "version": "", "version_exposed": false }
Understand
Public observation
Source
technology
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe the observed public artefact
What this does not prove
A visible dependency does not prove data location, actual contractual jurisdiction, or hidden subcontractors.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "name": "Apache",
    "version": "",
    "version_exposed": false
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#36 DNS public records

Evidence: spf_record

DNS shows how a domain resolves and which public services are associated with it.

Passive High
Why it matters

Consistent, verifiable resolution reduces some spoofing risks and helps explain entity dependencies.

What to check next

Compare NS, A/AAAA, MX, CAA and the DNSSEC chain with previous measurements to identify delegation or operator changes.

Possible action

If a change is unexpected, verify registrar and DNS-provider configuration before modifying anything. Document the failover mechanisms that actually exist.

Observation
v=spf1 include:spf.infomaniak.ch -all
Understand
Standard DNS resolution and record parsing
Source
DNS public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe public DNS data observed at scan time
What this does not prove
Public DNS does not prove physical server location, contracts, or global availability.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
v=spf1 include:spf.infomaniak.ch -all

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#37 Mail-related public records

Evidence: module_finding

Public mail policies show how the domain frames sending, authentication and email transport.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

These mechanisms can reduce domain spoofing and document mail-transport posture.

What to check next

Relate SPF, DKIM when a selector is known, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT. Compare policy changes over time.

Possible action

Before strengthening a policy, inventory legitimate mail flows and verify alignment. Roll out changes progressively to avoid blocking authorized senders.

Observation
{ "evidence": null, "severity": "low" }
Understand
Public DNS and policy endpoint inspection
Source
Mail-related public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe published mail authentication and transport policies
What this does not prove
They do not prove actual deliverability, every recipient’s behavior, or the absence of phishing.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "evidence": null,
    "severity": "low"
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#38 Mail-related public records

Evidence: mail_policy_flag

Public mail policies show how the domain frames sending, authentication and email transport.

Active non-intrusive High
Why it matters

These mechanisms can reduce domain spoofing and document mail-transport posture.

What to check next

Relate SPF, DKIM when a selector is known, DMARC, MX, MTA-STS and TLS-RPT. Compare policy changes over time.

Possible action

Before strengthening a policy, inventory legitimate mail flows and verify alignment. Roll out changes progressively to avoid blocking authorized senders.

Observation
Understand
Public DNS and policy endpoint inspection
Source
Mail-related public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe published mail authentication and transport policies
What this does not prove
They do not prove actual deliverability, every recipient’s behavior, or the absence of phishing.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#39 DNS public records

Evidence: dns_address

DNS shows how a domain resolves and which public services are associated with it.

Passive High
Why it matters

Consistent, verifiable resolution reduces some spoofing risks and helps explain entity dependencies.

What to check next

Compare NS, A/AAAA, MX, CAA and the DNSSEC chain with previous measurements to identify delegation or operator changes.

Possible action

If a change is unexpected, verify registrar and DNS-provider configuration before modifying anything. Document the failover mechanisms that actually exist.

Observation
185.125.27.195
Understand
Standard DNS resolution and record parsing
Source
DNS public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe public DNS data observed at scan time
What this does not prove
Public DNS does not prove physical server location, contracts, or global availability.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

Verify it yourself

This command reproduces the public observation without changing the target.

dig A dimaready.com && dig AAAA dimaready.com
View raw data 
185.125.27.195

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#40 openpgp_discovery

Evidence: openpgp_discovery

Scanapse shows visible providers and third-party services on which the public service depends.

Passive Medium
Why it matters

Concentration on one actor or many third parties can affect continuity and governance.

What to check next

Identify each provider role, functions concentrated on the same actor, and dependencies that appeared or disappeared since the previous scan.

Possible action

For a critical dependency, document owner, contract, reversibility, failover and rationale. Diversify only after analysing the actual need.

Observation
{ "dns_openpgpkey": { "reason": "recipient_identity_required", "state": "untested" }, "fingerprint": null, "mechanisms": [], "reason": "security_txt_encryption_not_observed", "state": "not_observed", "wkd": { "reason": "wkd_not_fetched_without_identity", "state": "untested" } }
Understand
Public observation
Source
openpgp_discovery
Reliability
Medium
What this supports
Describe the observed public artefact
What this does not prove
A visible dependency does not prove data location, actual contractual jurisdiction, or hidden subcontractors.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

View raw data 
{
    "dns_openpgpkey": {
        "reason": "recipient_identity_required",
        "state": "untested"
    },
    "fingerprint": null,
    "mechanisms": [],
    "reason": "security_txt_encryption_not_observed",
    "state": "not_observed",
    "wkd": {
        "reason": "wkd_not_fetched_without_identity",
        "state": "untested"
    }
}

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

#41 DNS public records

Evidence: mail_exchanger

DNS shows how a domain resolves and which public services are associated with it.

Passive High
Why it matters

Consistent, verifiable resolution reduces some spoofing risks and helps explain entity dependencies.

What to check next

Compare NS, A/AAAA, MX, CAA and the DNSSEC chain with previous measurements to identify delegation or operator changes.

Possible action

If a change is unexpected, verify registrar and DNS-provider configuration before modifying anything. Document the failover mechanisms that actually exist.

Observation
mta-gw.infomaniak.ch
Understand
Standard DNS resolution and record parsing
Source
DNS public records
Reliability
High
What this supports
Describe public DNS data observed at scan time
What this does not prove
Public DNS does not prove physical server location, contracts, or global availability.

Standards and reference context

Regulatory references are contextual only. Scanapse does not determine whether a framework applies to the organization and does not issue an automatic compliance verdict.

Verify it yourself

This command reproduces the public observation without changing the target.

dig MX dimaready.com
View raw data 
mta-gw.infomaniak.ch

Rule 2026.09.4 · 2026-09-05T17:21:35+00:00

Show technical details 
{
    "schema_version": "2.0",
    "engine_version": "2.8.0",
    "pattern_version": "2026.09.4",
    "scope": {
        "mode": "passive",
        "coverage": "full",
        "access_level": "full",
        "access_reason": "public_document_available",
        "requests": 2,
        "homepage_only": true,
        "javascript_executed": false,
        "ports_scanned": false,
        "private_networks_blocked": true,
        "protection_bypassed": false,
        "max_body_bytes": 1572864,
        "scan_budget_seconds": 24,
        "budget_exhausted": false,
        "transport": "curl_with_socket_fallback"
    },
    "entity": {
        "id": "3d1133096ac0e363d9e9316a4d37f3ca7d812f70772e92b013e9db433c201770",
        "display_name": "dimaready.com",
        "slug": "dimaready-com",
        "entity_type": "domain_subject",
        "auto_created": true,
        "primary_asset": "dimaready.com"
    },
    "methodology": {
        "version": "2.3.1",
        "model": "evidence_first",
        "principles": [
            "absence_of_evidence_is_not_evidence_of_absence",
            "unknown_remains_unknown",
            "provider_metadata_is_not_data_location",
            "edge_provider_is_not_origin_host",
            "single_snapshot_does_not_prove_resilience"
        ]
    },
    "trajectory_summary": {
        "has_previous_scan": true,
        "change_counts": {
            "appeared": 25,
            "disappeared": 22,
            "modified": 8,
            "stable": 9
        },
        "observation_count": 41,
        "evidence_count": 41,
        "provider_count": 1,
        "strategic_signal_count": 5,
        "top_signal_count": 5
    }
}